THE MEANING OF “LIFE”: THE MORNING-AFTER-PILL, THE QUESTION OF WHEN LIFE
BEGINS, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
by Jason M. Horst
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins.
When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine,
philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the
judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is
not in a position to speculate as to the answer.1
With the recent appointments of two Supreme Court justices widely viewed as
“pro-life,” the moral, political, and legal debate over questions of the proper scope of
constitutional limitations on abortion have rarely, if ever, been stronger.2 Indeed, South
Dakota’s legislature has recently considered passing a statute specifically aimed at
challenging Roe v. Wade, banning nearly all forms of abortion.3 Some have speculated
that under the new makeup of the Supreme Court, Roe may eventually be overturned and
the constitutional right to abortion eviscerated. For the time being, however, this Article
will assume that federal courts will continue to interpret and apply abortion law in its
current form.
The question of when life begins remains central to the question of the abortion
limitations. As quoted above, the Court in Roe purported to avoid answering this question
in holding that the Constitution forbids States from prohibiting all abortions.4 To this
point, the Court has been able to avoid dealing directly with this question. Even in
declaring a State interest in protecting potential life “[e]ven in the earliest stages of
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pregnancy,” the Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,5 steered clear of any discussion
of when pregnancy begins. Legal scholars from numerous camps of thought on judicial
review would undoubtedly hail this as proper restraint from intrusion into the most moral
of questions.
New State efforts to apply abortion restrictions to the emergency contraceptive
known as the morning-after-pill,6 however, threaten to make the Court’s deference shortlived. According to its advertisements, the morning-after-pill provides women with the
ability to prevent a pregnancy, defined as implantation in the uterus, within 3 days of
having unprotected sex.7 Because the morning-after-pill operates in a way similar to preintercourse contraceptives such as birth control pills and patches, but after sex and
potentially after fertilization, there have been arguments made both that the morningafter-pill is, as advertised, a contraceptive and also that it is abortion.8 Some States have
begun efforts to apply its abortion regulations, such as parental notification statutes, to
the morning after pill.9
This Article argues that such restrictions will likely lead to constitutional
challenges in which the court may be forced to decide between abortion law and
contraception law, a decision this Article argues is inextricably linked to a determination
as to when life begins. This is so primarily because distinctions in the reasoning behind
the Supreme Court’s contraception and abortion decisions suggest both that States have a
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greater authority to regulate abortion and that the legal difference between the two hinges
on the existence or non-existence of potential life.
The prospect of judges answering the question of when potential life begins
immediately draws cries about the inadequacies of judicial review in resolving such
moral questions. This Article argues that judges should indeed engage actively in
addressing the moral questions posed by restrictions on the morning-after-pill. The
Article draws in large part upon Christopher Eisgruber’s premise that judges are
democratic representatives of the American people and are well situated to decide moral
questions on the basis of moral reasoning.10
Indeed, judicial oversight is particularly appropriate because, when properly
viewed, limitations on the morning-after-pill will not beg the question, but rather reflect
the government’s answer to it. That is, applying general abortion regulations to the
morning-after-pill, for example by enforcing a legislative determination that human life
begins at the moment of fertilization, constitutes government imposition of its opinion as
to when life begins. As such, these restrictions will often raise significant questions about
State governments’ authority to so impose their moral positions, questions that even the
staunchest opponents of active judicial review acknowledge are appropriate for judicial
consideration.11 As discussed below, both structural considerations of federalism and
enumeration of powers, and the invalidity of State imposition of belief dictate that State
governments do not have this power.
Because courts will still have to choose between abortion and contraception
doctrine, the lack of any imposing State opinion does not remove the moral question. To
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the contrary, this scenario hoists the question of when life begins directly onto the courts.
This Article contends that even in such situations judges properly can, and must, decide
constitutional challenges to the morning-after-pill.
This argument has the potential to raise majoritarian concerns about judges
supplanting the will of a State’s people. These concerns are well intentioned, but they can
be alleviated through proper jurisprudence. Judges should take care not to simply import
their own moral views in making this determination. Instead, courts must, as best they
can, adopt and apply a constitutional definition of abortion that is consistent with the
American people’s beliefs regarding when pregnancy or potential life begins and how
personal beliefs about this subject should impact reproductive rights. This complex set of
beliefs should guide a court’s choice as to whether to consider the morning-after-pill
contraception or abortion for constitutional purposes. Finally, the Article argues that in
light of the American people’s beliefs regarding the effect their personal moral beliefs
should have on personal freedoms, judges attempting to determine the point at which the
Constitution recognizes the existence of potential life should adopt a presumption of
invalidity for any definition that would impair individual personal freedoms. This
presumption, however, should be rebuttable on a finding that a supermajority of the
public believes that the existence of potential life at a particular point enjoys such
widespread acceptance that it should affect the legal rights of even those who do not so
believe.
Part I establishes the possibility that State application of abortion restrictions to
the morning-after-pill will result in the need for a court to decide whether the morningafter-pill is contraception or abortion. Part II first argues that State governments do not
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have the authority to impose their views regarding when life begins on the people in their
States. Second, Part II argues for the propriety of judicial review as a mechanism for
deciding whether to lump the morning-after-pill in with abortion or with contraception
for constitutional purposes. Specifically, Part II argues that courts should adopt the
rebuttable presumption described briefly above in order to honor the will of the American
people themselves.
I. State Application of Parental Consent Statutes to the Morning-after-pill Has the
Potential to Force Courts Into Deciding When Life Begins
As of the writing of this Article, the constitutional quandaries raised by State
limitations on access to the morning-after-pill are hypothetical. The lawyers and scholars
at this point are battling for the most part over whether States may properly require
pharmacists to supply the morning-after-pill.12 This Part predicts, however, that budding
State efforts to limit access to the morning-after-pill will inevitably result in
constitutional challenges. Further, this Part will show that courts face a significant
dilemma in hearing such challenges. There is at the very least a significant possibility that
courts addressing these challenges could legitimately find the limits on access
constitutional if they considered the morning-after-pill abortion, but unconstitutional if
they considered the morning-after-pill contraception. Finally, this Part contends that
because the morning-after-pill falls in between that which is universally thought of as
abortion and that which is universally believed to be pure contraception, courts will find
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themselves in a position where it may be necessary to identify the point at which life
begins.
a. The Morning-after-pill Allows Women to Prevent Ovulation,
Fertilization, or Implantation
In order to understand why much of the State action that this Article argues will
create constitutional questions affects the morning-after-pill, and indeed to understand
much of the discussion that follows, we must understand how the morning-after-pill
functions. This Article will not delve too deeply into the medical complexities that
account of the morning-after-pill’s effectiveness.13 Rather, it provides only the most basic
overview of the way the drug functions.
The operative agent in the morning-after-pill is levongestrel.14 Advertisements for
the drug state that it potentially serves three functions.15 The pill operates “mainly by
stopping the release of an egg from the ovary, and may also prevent the fertilization of an
egg.”16 Additionally, the drug “may also work by preventing it from attaching to the
uterus (womb).”17 This latter process, commonly known as implantation, occurs after
fertilization has already occurred.18
Conclusive scientific evidence remains unavailable as to exactly how the
morning-after-pill operates in any given case, due to the difficulty in determining exactly
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when a woman ovulates19 and of determining whether pregnancy failure in the postovulation period was due to want of fertilization or inability to implant.20 “With few
exceptions, the fact that an entity or a process is altered by the treatment does not
necessarily mean that it explains how pregnancy is prevented in real life situations.”21
Some evidence does suggest that the effect that the morning-after-pill will have depends
somewhat on the amount of time that has elapsed between intercourse and administration
of the drug and may also depend on the time of ovulation.22 At least one study has shown
that “effects [of the morning-after-pill] that prevent ovulation or fertilization are likely to
be the main mechanism of action of emergency contraceptive pills.”23 This presumption
was drawn from the fact that the pill’s efficacy diminishes the longer a woman waits to
take it after intercourse.24 Other studies, however, lend more credence to the prospect that
the morning-after-pill does have a post-fertilization effect,25 and nearly all studies show
that the morning-after-pill creates physical conditions inhospitable for implantation.26
Based upon the foregoing discussion, any legal analysis of limitation to access of
the morning-after-pill must presume that, in at least some cases, the morning-after-pill
causes a failure of fertilized eggs to implant in a woman’s uterus. The significance of this
presumption, if not clear already, will quickly become evident.
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b. Ovulation, Fertilization, Implantation, and Beliefs About When Human
Life Begins
The medical definition of pregnancy, as set forth by the American Conference of
Obstetrics and Gynecologists (“ACOG”), is the time between implantation and live birth
or other termination.27 Were we all to accept this definition wholesale, this Article would
indeed be a relatively simple undertaking. There is no debate that an abortion should be
defined as anything other than the termination of a pregnancy. If there were likewise no
dispute as to the fact that pregnancy begins at implantation, there would be no reason for
courts to find otherwise.
In fact, however, there are numerous other stages in human development that
certain individuals believe should be considered to starting point of “the human
individual.”28 Perhaps the most common answer to the question of when people believe
human life begins would be fertilization.29 If this were true, a drug that prevents postfertilization development could reasonably be considered an abortifacient. Indeed, many
believe this to be the case.30
There are also those who believe that because genetic uniqueness is bestowed
upon an oocyte (an egg) just before ovulation, the human individual begins at that point,
even before fertilization.31 Such a belief may call into question whether even drugs or
devices that prevent fertilization are properly named contraceptives. Others believe that a
fetus does not become an individual until electrical brain activity begins, which takes
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place around twelve weeks after fertilization.32 Those who accept this view may thus
consider the vast majority of abortions performed in the United States more akin to
contraception. While this Article focuses primarily on the interval between fertilization
and implantation it is important to note the widely divergent views in this area.
c. Some State Governments Have Begun to Consider the Morning-after-pill
to be Abortion or Adopt Restrictions Similar to Those on Abortion
Social conservative politicians in several State governments have either attempted
to apply parental consent abortion statutes to limit distribution of the morning-after-pill to
minors or taken steps to create such statutes tailored specifically for the morning-afterpill. Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney vetoed legislation designed to expand access
to the morning-after-pill due to concerns about the lack of any parental notification
requirement.33 Governor Romney felt that the statute, which included no age limitation
on access to the morning-after-pill, would alter Massachusetts parental consent laws for
abortion.34 Thus, Governor Romney assumed that the parental consent regulation for
abortion in general already limited minors’ access to the morning-after-pill.
Other States actually have statutes on their books that may implicitly direct State
executives to treat the morning-after-pill as abortion.35 Missouri’s legislature has made
official findings that “[t]he life of each human being begins at conception.”36 In
Wisconsin, “‘Abortion’ means the use of an instrument, medicine, drug or other
substance or device with intent to terminate the pregnancy of a woman known to be
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pregnant or for whom there is reason to believe that she may be pregnant.”37 Either of
these statutes arguably allows, and potentially even requires, State officials to enforce the
States’ preexisting limitations on access to abortions against those seeking access to the
morning-after-pill. Justice Stevens suggested as much, stating that the Missouri
legislature’s finding that life begins at conception, defined “as ‘the fertilization of the
ovum of a female by a sperm of a male . . . . implies regulation . . . of common forms of
contraception such as . . . the morning-after-pill.”38
Still other States are getting even more specific. The New Hampshire Legislature,
for instance, is considering a bill that would require parental notification prior to a
pharmacist dispensing the drug.39
As discussed more thoroughly below, specifically tailored legislation is different
in important ways from government action that makes the morning-after-pill an
abortifacient under State law. On the surface, at least, the State is not regulating the pill
out of a belief that it constitutes abortion. As we will see below, however, this difference
does not likely go much deeper than the surface. Nearly every State has some sort of
parental consent or notification statute on the books that would limit young women’s
access to abortions.40 No State has a law that requires all minors to engage their parents
in order to receive contraceptives.41 As such, it seems far from clear that the motivations
related to abortion beliefs failed to influence legislation specifically tailored to the
morning-after-pill.
37
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d. Courts Hearing Constitutional Challenges to Such Actions May Have to
Decide Whether to Apply Abortion or Contraception Law, a Decision
Implicating the Question of When Life Begins
Without question, the State actions described above will result in constitutional
challenges brought by reproductive rights groups on behalf of women denied access to
the morning-after-pill. This Part argues that applying or imposing restrictions such as
parental notification or consent requirements to the morning-after-pill may be
unconstitutional under contraception doctrine, but constitutional under abortion doctrine.
Thus courts cannot necessarily avoid addressing the issue of when life begins in some
way.
i. The Effect of When Life Begins on State Authority to Regulate
Abortion and Contraception
Implicit in the reasoning of both the Supreme Court and lower federal courts
ruling on abortion and contraception cases is an understanding both that the line that
divides abortion and contraception is when life begins and that States have a greater
authority to regulate abortion.
One need not look further than the Supreme Court’s benchmark contraception and
abortion cases in order to find evidence of courts’ treatment of contraception as prior to
the origins of new human life and abortion as after. In Griswold v. Connecticut,42 neither
the Court’s majority and concurring opinions nor its dissents refer to any interests beyond
those of the individuals denied the right to contraceptive services.43 Roe, and Casey, on
the other hand, are replete with references to a State’s interest in preserving “potential
life.”44 Indeed, Justice Blackmun’s lengthy opinion in Roe expressly distinguishes
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abortion from contraception, extending principles from Griswold, yet distinguishing it on
the basis that a “pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy” due to the existence
of potential life.45 The Casey Court went even further, placing an import on the State’s
interest in protecting potential life great enough to balance, to a limited extent, against a
woman’s fundamental right to choose whether to have an abortion. Without a finding that
potential life existed at the time of an abortion, but not at the time of contraception, it is
difficult to see why Roe was in any way a dramatic extension of Griswold, much less to
explain why the public abortion debate remains so rich despite the relatively minimal
clamor over the legality of contraception.
Because abortion involves potential life and States have a legitimate interest in
protecting that potential life, and because potential life and the corresponding State
interest are not present in contraceptive choices, States have greater authority to regulate
abortion decisions than contraception decisions. Courts do often conflate the
constitutional standards with which to adjudicate State limitations on contraception with
those used to evaluate abortion limitations.46 Even in doing so, however, courts
acknowledge a distinction between the two standards; either implicitly or explicitly,
courts scrutinize limitations on rights to use and access to contraception to a greater
degree than they do abortion rights.47 Justice Brennan expressed this distinction clearly,
stating that “[t]he State's interests in protection of the mental and physical health of the
45

See Roe, 160–64.
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Assn. of Utah v. Matheson, 582 F.Supp. 1001, 1007–09 (1983) (applying
reasoning and holdings of various abortion decisions to a constitutional challenge to Utah law restricting
State funds for contraception).
47
See, e.g., id. at 1009 n.9 (reserving expressly the question as to whether a hypothetical parental consent
statute that included some maturity evaluation process would pass constitutional muster despite earlier
acknowledgment of abortion cases in which the Supreme Court found that such bypass procedures made
otherwise unconstitutional parental consent statutes constitutional); Parents United for Better Schools v.
School Dist. of Philadelphia Bd. of Educ., 978 F.Supp. 197, 209 (1997) (stating that “States have even less
interest in regulating minors’ access to contraception than in regulating minors’ access to abortion”).
46

12

pregnant minor, and in protection of potential life are clearly more implicated by the
abortion decision than by the decision to use a nonhazardous contraceptive.”48
ii. The Morning-after-pill Potentially Could Be Constitutionally
Limited to Minors if Considered Abortion but Not if Considered
Contraception
Given the disparity in State authority over abortion and contraception decisions,
there is a strong possibility that certain restrictions can be constitutionally applied to
abortion decisions but not to contraceptive choices. For example, in the context of
abortion, “the State may enact rules and regulations designed to encourage her to know
that there are philosophic and social arguments of great weight that can be brought to
bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy to full term and that there are procedures and
institutions to allow adoption of unwanted children as well as a certain degree of State
assistance if the mother chooses to raise the child herself.”49 The Casey Court held that
this allowance justifies requirements that minors involve their parents in abortion
decisions and that women wait twenty-four hours before having the procedure.50
It is certainly possible that a court may find that morning-after-pill cases are
distinguishable, given the wait might actually prove prohibitive in many cases due to the
short window during which the drug is effective. Without question, some judges
presented with the question would find that even if considered abortion, parental
notification with judicial bypass or a twenty-four hour waiting period constitute an undue
burden, and are therefore unconstitutional restraints. Such a holding has merit from the
perspective of judicial restraint, as these courts would avoid the moral question at the
heart of this Article.
48
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The problem with holding that the parental involvement statutes and waiting
periods constitute an undue burden on teens is that such a holding necessarily rests on
highly tenuous logic, given the Supreme Court’s current abortion jurisprudence.
Especially in the case of parental notification and judicial bypass, Supreme Court cases
holding these restraints on abortion are constitutional are based on the premise that, as a
class, minors are less mature than adults, and hence less capable of making reasoned
decisions.51 As such, the state has an interest in seeing that a mature adult can advise the
minor in the decision-making process, or at least that the minor can be judged responsible
enough to make the decision on her own. If one holds that a young woman need not be
subject to such restrictions because of the time constraints involved in the morning-after
pill, the holding necessarily rests on the premise that some right to choose the means of
abortion outweigh any considerations of mature decision-making. The Supreme Court
has yet to recognize any such right.
Indeed, such a right would stand in direct conflict with the Court’s current
doctrine. If it is a child’s maturity to make the decision without assistance that is at issue,
it does not seem to follow that a right to choose one method of abortion over another
should be given greater weight than the recognized state interest. There are two potential
ways that one might reason otherwise. This first is that concerns over safety and
invasiveness of particular methods must be taken into account in assessing whether it is
constitutional to place certain limitations on minors seeking abortions. A woman’s health
has certainly been recognized as a critical factor in abortion doctrine. Common early
abortion methods, however, have become increasingly safe, such that concerns over
safety are minimal. Invasiveness of alternative procedures may be a more substantial
51
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argument. Nonetheless, this again requires the creation of previously unrecognized
abortion rights. Thus, while it remains possible that a right to choose the means of your
abortion should be a fundamental right, protected against a states interest in educated
decision-making, judges cannot, at this point, comfortably rely on such a right to answer
the question presented in this Article.
Further, attacks on the constitutionality of particular methods of abortion runs
afoul by failing to respect the current judicial understanding of abortion. The Supreme
Court has made clear that where potential life is at issue, the state has an interest in
protecting that potential life. As is discussed more thoroughly below, the Court’s
emphasis on potential life as creating a state interest balanced against a woman’s
unfettered right to choose whether to terminate her pregnancy means that a finding that a
particular procedure is abortion has a special significance. If the morning-after-pill is held
to be abortion, the state may balance the potential life involved against a woman’s rights,
and thus justify a number of restrictions on her access to the procedure.
It is far from clear, however, that a State may constitutionally place the same
restrictions on access to contraception. Indeed, at least one federal court has specifically
acknowledged the possibility that the same kind of parental consent and notification laws,
explicitly sanctioned by the Supreme Court in the context of abortion, may be
unconstitutional as to contraception.52
Moreover, Supreme Court doctrine currently requires very distinct formulas for
analyzing abortion and contraception regulations. Pre-viability abortion regulations are
analyzed under the “undue burden” standard articulated in Casey.53 There, the Court
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made clear that it was disavowing a strict scrutiny standard for such regulations. To the
contrary, the Court’s benchmark contraception decision uses the strongest of language in
asserting that regulations touching contraceptive choices must meet strict scrutiny,
serving a compelling State interest.54 Casey explicitly changed this standard in abortion
cases, but the Court has not done so in the context of contraception. The result of these
differing standards is that parental consent, informed consent, and waiting period laws,
struck down only if they act as a substantial obstacle to a woman’s abortion decision,
may have a harder time withstanding judicial scrutiny when applied to contraception
decisions.
In sum, there is a likelihood that regulations such as those currently being
considered to limit access to the morning-after-pill, while constitutional under abortion
law, are unconstitutional under contraception doctrine. Affirmatively proving this point
would be an article unto itself. This Part has simply attempted to show that such a
conclusion is a very real possibility.
In the context of our larger discussion, the possibility that parental notification
statutes and the like would be unconstitutional in the contraception context but not in the
abortion context means that the constitutionality of limitations on access to the morningafter-pill may hinge on whether courts consider it to be abortion or contraception.
Likewise, the fact that the divide between contraception and abortion has been drawn at
the beginning of pregnancy and the corresponding beginning of potential human life
means that in order to decide whether the morning-after-pill is abortion or contraception
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courts must decide whether it acts before or after the start of pregnancy. Courts cannot do
so without deciding when pregnancy, when life, begins.
Courts’ inclination will likely be to avoid this last question. They may be inclined
instead to adopt some sort of continuum approach, treating the morning-after-pill as a
step in-between abortion and contraception thus entitled to a mid-level protection against
government intrusion. The nature of the distinction that this Part has discussed, however,
sets abortion and contraception on either end of a miraculously bright line that allows for
no in-between. Thus, if you accept the distinction drawn, and if there is a practical
distinction in the treatment of statutes regulating abortion from those regulating
contraception, the morning-after-pill must find a place on one side of that line or the
other. The question then becomes how judges should decide which side the morningafter-pill belongs on.
II. Judges Should Decide Whether to Apply Abortion or Contraception Law to the
Morning-after-pill in Light of Their Role as Representatives of the People
This Part argues that Courts should decide whether to consider the morning-afterpill abortion or contraception by adopting an approach to judicial review commensurate
with Christopher Eisgruber’s theory that judges should act as representatives of the
American people in deciding cases.55 Eisgruber has freely admitted that his work does not
offer “constitutional judges any sort of ‘cookbook’ to get them through hard cases,” and
has in fact argued that a general jurisprudential technique demanding “such ‘specificity is
impossible or undesirable.’”56 To the contrary, this Article’s very purpose is to provide a
cookbook of sorts for judges presented with the constitutional challenges to limitations on
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access to the morning-after-pill. This should not be confused, however, with an attempt to
set out a jurisprudential technique of general applicability. Rather than adopting
Eisgruber’s theory only to reject one of its central premises,
this Article proposes methodology that aims to be both limited to the set of facts
we have discussed and true to a judge’s role as a representative of the American people.
The Article does not offer a definitive answer to this question, but simply presents an
analytical framework for judges to use and some factors they might consider.
The Article argues that constitutional courts must attempt to determine the
American people’s beliefs as to the question of whether the morning-after-pill should be
treated as contraception or as abortion for constitutional purposes. This Part first argues
that State governments have no authority to adopt views as to when life begins and then
impose those views on the people within the State. It explains that federalism and
institutional considerations dictate against allowing State legislators and executives to
define the federal Constitution. Further, States lack authority in this area because it is a
matter purely of belief, and a State may not justify its laws based on belief alone.
Second, this Part presents a framework through which judges can
attempt to derive the American people’s view as to whether courts should consider the
morning-after-pill abortion or contraception. This inquiry great complexity, for it
involves a probe, not only of the people’s views on the question of when life begins, but
also, and more importantly on the effect that the American people believe that their
individual views should have on the legal rights of others. This Part argues that, for the
most part, Americans believe that their moral opinions should not affect the personal
freedoms of others. Nonetheless, Americans do have a tipping point at which they a
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belief is shared widely enough and felt strongly enough that Americans believe the belief
should impact legal rights.
As such, the Article proposes that judges adopt a framework that treats any
constitutional interpretation as to the beginning of life presumptively improper if it would
adversely affect individuals’ personal freedoms. While this is a sweeping presumption, it
is consistent with the American people’s feelings about the effect their moral beliefs
should have on the legal treatment of their peers, at least as applied to the context of
reproductive decisions. Further, the Article proposes that the presumption may be
rebutted on a finding that a supermajority of the American people believe both in the
moral premise and in the premise that it should have legal force. This allows judges to
honor the exceptional circumstances in which Americans feel there is such a consensus
regarding an issue of great import that moral beliefs may play a role in defining the law
even at the cost of personal freedoms. This super-majoritarian concept is reconcilable
with constitutional structure, Supreme Court precedent on reproductive rights under
substantive due process, and the thinking at the heart of our criminal law.
Because evidence of the American people’s beliefs as to each of these questions
will not always be readily available, judges will often have to exercise moral reasoning in
attempt to derive them. The people, however, also have a desire to see “moral issues”
decided on the basis of moral reasons that have some popular appeal.”57 As such, this
Article echoes Eisgruber’s call for judges to exercise their own reasoning in deciding
what effect the views of the majority of Americans should have on the legal rights of
their peers.
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The piece of the proposed analytic framework that calls on judges to undertake an
independent analysis immediately draws concerns regarding substitution of judicial
morality for that of the people. Considered as a whole, however, the analysis set forth
below lessens the need for this concern by recommending independent judicial reasoning
be used in light of critical empirical analysis of the American people’s views, rather than
as a lone mechanism of decision-making. A judge’s role requires not only deriving the
will of the majority of Americans (even through reasoned analysis of the people’s beliefs
that transcends simple counting of hands at the polling place), but also undertaking a
reasoned analysis to ensure that the effect the majority’s beliefs have on specific issues
are consistent with their principles. Courts, for example, should protect against violation
of individual rights, even through majority decision-making. Ronald Dworkin has
expressed that “[r]ights . . . are best understood as trumps over some background
justification for political decisions that States a goal for the community as a whole.”58
This Article suggests that rights are, in fact, broader goals for the community in
themselves, goals that often supercede the community’s issue-specific goals. As such,
courts deciding whether to consider the morning-after-pill abortion or contraception must
evaluate the American people’s view as when life begins, and then assess the people’s
views as to how rights and other considerations should effect the governmental
application of their issue-specific beliefs.
a. State Government Authority to Impose Its Opinion as to When Life
Begins
All of the contexts in which States limit access to the morning-after-pill seem to
involve the application of a State government’s opinion as to when life begins. Certainly
58
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this is true of affirmative declarations by State legislatures that life begins at conception
and State actions applying existing abortion laws to the morning-after-pill. The point may
also be applicable to State legislative action specifically attacking access to the morningafter-pill. As indicated above, no State has a law that requires all minors to engage their
parents in order to receive contraceptives.59 Legislative beliefs that life begins at
conception thus seem the likely reason for placing such restrictions on access to the
morning-after-pill.60 Foremost, if one accepts the possibility set forth above—that the
regulations States are placing on the morning-after-pill are constitutional under abortion
law and may be unconstitutional under contraception law and that there is no inbetween—States may be in a position that they can defend their restrictions on access to
the morning-after-pill only by asserting that the drug causes abortion, that it terminates
existing potential human life.
It is quite likely that a number of women seeking access to the morning-after-pill
will not share this view. The question, then, is what level of deference, if any, should
constitutional courts give to a State’s determination that the morning-after-pill is abortion
in the face of challenges brought by those that believe otherwise? This Part argues that
the determination should receive no deference.
At first blush this position might seem somewhat extreme. Should State
governments not have the first crack at adopting definitional standards of law? States are
allowed to legislate definitions of death in the context of murder statutes, organ
donations, estates, torts etc, why not allow them to define life? On closer examination,
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however, it becomes clear that States have no business defining the morning-after-pill
either as contraceptive or abortifacient because the definitional question presents a
combination of constitutional interpretation and religious belief, neither of which fall
within the proscriptive powers of the States.
Belief is a key word here. There is no scientific proof, nor can there likely ever be
any such proof, of when human life begins, when one is ensouled, for those who believe
in a human soul. All that exists is a series of individual and collective beliefs about when
(and if) this happens. Yet, as Roe and Casey make clear, the constitutional considerations
involved in reviewing a particular method of preventing live birth depend greatly on
whether the practice takes place before or after the beginning of pregnancy—whether
there is potential life to consider.61
At issue, then, is not an individual State’s definition of pregnancy or when life
begins, but rather the constitutional definition. The question to answer, therefore, is not
necessarily whether life begins at conception or implantation, but rather at which of these
points (or at what other point) the Constitution should recognize the existence of potential
life. And all we have to go on is belief.
In this context, a picture of why States may not take the first bite at the
definitional apple begins to emerge. It could not reasonably be said that a State’s
definition of condom use as abortion would receive any deference from a federal court
today. Nor would a definition of pregnancy that commences twelve weeks after
implantation, such that the vast majority of procedures now commonly considered
abortion would be defined as contraception. But why?
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There are two primary reasons. First, because the situation involves interpretation
of the federal Constitution, federalism and enumeration of powers make this question one
for the federal judiciary, not the State legislature and executive. Second, the State
imposition of a religious belief on the people within, having the practical effect of
limiting individual rights, offends substantive due process principals.
i. State Authority over Constitutional Interpretation
Once we understand that the pivotal question presented by challenges to
restrictions on access to the morning-after-pill, unlike the majority of challenges to State
regulations on those within its jurisdiction, is one of federal constitutional meaning, it is
clear that federalism principles foreclose States from speaking with authority on the
subject. As Justice Story expressed just thirty years after the Constitution’s ratification:
“It is manifest that the constitution has proceeded upon a theory of its own, and given or
withheld powers according to the judgment of the American people, by whom it was
adopted.”62 The American people gave the new federal government the authority and
ability to make and interpret its own laws, which would be binding on the States, despite
the considerable retention of States’ sovereignty within their jurisdictions. As such,
federalism requires that federal courts have final say over determinations of federal law.63
This allows for a necessary uniformity in federal law throughout the States.64 Nowhere is
such uniformity so important as in treatment of interpretive questions such as when the
Constitution should first recognize potential life.
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It is certainly true that State courts play some role in constitutional jurisprudence.
The Constitution makes this much clear through the Supremacy Clause.65 Indeed, nothing
in this Article should be construed to argue that State courts may not have a go at the
constitutional question involved in challenges on restrictions to the morning-after-pill.
Indeed, while the federal judiciary and ultimately the Supreme Court will have the final
word, many of these challenges may originate in State courts. This Article intends to lay
down principles to be used by both federal and State courts. The argument here is simply
that State legislatures and executives should not be awarded any deference in what is
purely a question of interpretive definition.
To find otherwise would be to allow States in a sense to legislatively create
“potential life,” the protection of which the Supreme Court in Roe and its progeny has
held can be weighed in drafting abortion regulations. Ronald Dworkin has painted a
colorful picture of what would be possible were States to have the constitutional authority
to add persons to the constitutional order; one in which newspapers become extinct as a
result of protecting the due process rights of trees and corporations could vote elect one
of their own as a United States Senator for the State of Delaware.66 This would be
possible because “the suggestion that the Constitution allows States to bestow
personhood on fetuses assumes . . . . that a State can curtail constitutional rights by
adding new persons to the constitutional population, to the list of those whose
constitutional rights are competitive with one another.”67 These absurdities illustrate
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further the problems with allowing States to justify limitations on access to the morningafter-pill based on the States’ determinations as to when life begins.
The conclusion that State legislatures and executives are entitled no deference
does not offend respect for the States as sovereigns. Not even Congress has the
interpretive power to legislate constitutional meaning.68 While Congress does receive
some deference from the courts in matters on which the Supreme Court has not yet
ruled,69 this makes sense in light of its nationwide authority, which alleviates the
uniformity concerns mentioned above.70
The preceding discussion provides at least two partial answers to the question of
why the issues presented by challenges to limitations on access to the morning-afterpill
are distinguishable from a hypothetical review of State statutes defining death in the
context of murder statutes. First, the definition at issue in the latter context involves
interpretation of state law, not federal. As such, federalism concerns regarding
interpretation of the federal Constitution are not present. Second, and consequently, the
interest in universality of the definition is insubstantial. It should be noted, however, that
even in this context, States themselves have felt compelled to achieve universality. This
is why most States have adopted the Uniform Determination of Death Act.71
ii. State Authority and Belief
The second problem for State legislatures and executives is tied to the concept of
belief. Given that only belief can presently answer the question of when potential life first
exists, only belief can possibly justify any State’s declared definition of when pregnancy
68
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or potential life begins. As such, current Supreme Court substantive due process doctrine
would never allow such a belief to significantly impair the individual liberties of
American people.
While questions of belief seem to touch freedom of religion more than any other
individual right, the Supreme Court has made clear that the right to develop one’s own
beliefs is encompassed within the liberty rights protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment,72 limiting States’ authority to resolve questions of belief.73
The Court’s reasoning in Casey illustrates this well. There, the Court found that the
“conventional constitutional doctrine that where reasonable people disagree the
government can adopt one position or the other,” did not apply when the State, in so
adopting, intruded upon protected liberties.74 In words prophetically applicable to our
current discussion, the Court Stated: “At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.
Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they
formed under compulsion of the State.”75
Casey does not stand alone in protecting personal belief from State intrusion. The
Court had previously declared that “a State may not adopt one theory of when life begins
to justify its regulation of abortion.”76 Further, Lawrence v. Texas,77 stands for the
proposition that States may not enforce a belief that homosexual sodomy is immoral.78
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This line of cases stands firmly for the premise that States have no authority to legislate
belief.
The Supreme Court has stated that Roe “implies no limitation on the authority of a
State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion.”79 Such a value
judgment, however, does not amount to State imposition of its beliefs, but rather State
declaration of its beliefs. The Court has been clear that due process forbids States from
reaching the imposition stage. As one scholar puts it: “Obviously, the question of the
precise moment of ensoulment (assuming that there is such a thing) is none of Caesar’s
concern.”80
Certainly, the First Amendment may also present obstacles for State
determinations regarding the morning-after-pill.81 The question of how to define
pregnancy has the potential to touch both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of
the First Amendment.82 This Article focuses, however, on substantive due process, and,
as such, full discussion of the First Amendment’s effects on analysis of the question
before us is beyond the scope of the present discussion.
iii. State Assertion of Public Health Concerns
The State interest often asserted for restrictions on the morning-after-pill, of
course, will be more paternalistic than philosophical. The FDA has already latched onto a
dearth of research as to the morning-after-pill’s effects on women under age sixteen to
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justify attempts to limiting over-the-counter access to the drug.83 Protecting the health of
its citizens is certainly a legitimate State interest.84 Courts have a responsibility, however,
to ensure that a State assertion that it is acting to protect citizens cannot serve as
smokescreen to justify an otherwise improper moral imposition on those citizens.85
Nothing suggests that State concerns over the effects on the morning-after-pill are
anything more than smokescreen. There has, indeed, been widespread speculation that the
FDA’s use of the public health justification is disingenuous, masking political pressures
from those who have moral problems with the morning-after-pill.86 The morning-afterpill does cause stomach pain, nausea, and vomiting in some women.87 It is not
reasonable, however, to think that FDA is withholding wider access to the morning-afterpill on the threat of a stomachache. After extensive research, the morning-after-pill,
contrary to RU-486, has not produced any serious side effects at any age level.88 Thus,
basing limits on access on the rationale that effects on teens are uncertain seems
unreasonable at best and insincere at worst.
b. Deciding Between Contraception and Abortion Law Requires Courts to
Derive the American People’s Moral Opinion as to Whether the
Constitution Treats the Morning-after-pill as Abortion or Contraception
Having answered the question of whether State governments have the authority to
impose their view about life’s commencement in the negative, constitutional judges
facing challenges to access limitations are not yet out of the woods. These judges must
still decide whether to apply contraception or abortion law. As such, they must decide
83

Gardiner Harris, Drugs, Politics, and the F.D.A., N.Y. TIMES 11 (Aug. 25, 2005). The FDA subsequently
approved over-the-counter access to the drug for those over the age of eighteen.
84
See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24–29 (1905).
85
See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v.
Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1238 (2004).
86
CITE EDITORIALS
87
88

28

whether the Constitution should recognize the existence of human life at the time of
conception.
The discussion above provides a structural answer to why judges may
appropriately answer this question. The matter involves constitutional interpretation, the
province of the courts. The second concern discussed above, that the government may not
impose its beliefs on the people, makes it less clear that courts are entitled to decide this
question. Would judges themselves not be imposing their own beliefs on the people (and
not just the people of one State, but the American people as a whole) were they to answer
the question one way or another?
This Part seeks first to alleviate this fear, as well as the corresponding concern
that one or several judges may displace the will of the majority. Second, it seeks to
provide for constitutional judges a blueprint for how to analyze the question of when the
Constitution first recognizes the existence of potential life.
i. Judicial Imposition of Belief and Majoritarian Concerns
The concern that judges will simply replace a State’s belief about when potential
human life begins with their own in adopting a constitutional definition of pregnancy is a
valid one. “[A]bsent an authoritative source of bonos mores, judges necessarily bring to
bear their own moral positions any time they review the legal sufficiency of a moralsbased rationale.”89 Fortunately, however, judges do have such an authoritative source: the
American people.
Judges should view their charge in answering constitutional questions involving
moral dilemmas as finding the American people’s opinion as to the best way to resolve
the complex web of questions involved. In the context of our discussion, this means that
89
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judges must determine not only the American people’s beliefs as to the question of when
life begins, but also the people’s beliefs as to what effect the people would want their
beliefs as to when life begins to have on the judicial process. “Constructing the American
people’s conception of justice is not the same thing as expressing one’s own conception
of justice or as expressing the best conception of justice, whatever that may mean.”90 As
long as judges remain true to their charge, there is no reason to fear their rulings as
impositions of belief on the people, for the beliefs being imposed are those of the people.
While judges drawing upon a set of mores beyond their own may seem
implausible, judges at the highest level already do so. Casey is a wonderful example of
judges doing just that.91 The Court in Casey reaffirmed the “essential holding” of Roe,
that women have the right to choose to have an abortion before viability of a fetus.92 Yet
the Opinion of the Court, written by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, states
expressly: “Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic principles
of morality.”93 The Justices nonetheless believed that a higher morality than their own
had to control their analysis.94
It is noteworthy here that, as discussed in more detail below, the beliefs that
should be judicially implemented are not simply those about when life begins, but also
about how this first set of beliefs should effect? the legal rights of the people.95 Thus,
courts impose not even the American people’s beliefs regarding when life begins, but
rather attempt to provide the contextual application of the people’s concept of justice.
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Most simply put, this Article argues that judges should interpret the Constitution as
would the American people.
The majoritarian concerns that some will continue to have with this Article’s
propositions have been dealt with adeptly by Eisgruber, who reveals these concerns as a
misunderstanding of the nature of democracy.96 While neither he, nor much less I, will
ever convince all of those who maintain a contrary view of democracy, it is worthwhile to
discuss how the conception of democracy assumed in this Article answers traditional
majoritarian concerns regarding active judicial review on questions such as the
constitutional definition of pregnancy.
Properly viewed, “judicial review is, among other things, a device for regulating
federalism. It is an institution through which the national government supervises State
and local institutions.”97 This supervision is necessary precisely because democracy
constitutes something more than deriving the will of the majority.98 It charges
government with the duty to represent all of the people.99 “The democratic character of
moral decision-making . . . turns on the character of the government’s reasons, not on the
sheer size of the constituency for those reasons.”100 Judges (federal in particular), because
of the ties to mainstream politics required to ascend to the bench, and because of the
nature of judicial office once they do get there, including insulation from those same
politics and the obligation to issue public, reasoned opinions, are well-suited to ensure the
highest character of the reasons for the government’s moral decision-making.101
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Moreover, simple majoritarian decision-making is ill-suited for complex moral
policy questions. Indeed, perhaps the most significant problem with pure majoritarianism
in the context of moral decision-making is that the majority often fails to use sound moral
reasoning in reaching its decisions, rather succumbing to self-interest. Certainly this can
be seen to the extent we equate the legislative process with expression of majoritarian
views. Imagine that the question of when the Constitution should first recognize the
existence of potential life was put squarely before Congress for an up-or-down vote.
Realistically, the vast majority of Senators and Congressmen would base their decision
not on any reasoned moral analysis, but rather on polling data and how pro-life or prochoice those polls tell them they should appear to their constituents.102
Self-interest does not have to be so tangible.103 Self-interest includes interests in
avoiding exposure to offensive conduct.104 It is for this reason that rationales underlying
government regulation of certain aspects of sexual behavior create unique constitutional
concerns.105 “Comingl[ing] intense pleasures, dark power relationships, and mysteries of
human creation. . . . rivets attention and frustrates understanding.”106 As a result,

First, judges have life tenure and good jobs; hence they are insulated from the pull of interests
that might distort the judgment of other decision-makers. Second, judges’ votes often have a
decisive impact, hence judges have an incentive to take personal responsibility for their
choices. Third, judges must give a public account their reasoning; hence they put their
reputation for fairness on the line whenever they issue a decision. Fourth, judges are
appointed on the basis of their political views and political connections; hence their views of
justice are unlikely to be radically at odds with the American mainstream
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individuals tend to define themselves by condemning the sexual practices of others.107 As
such, Eisgruber has suggested that judges must take care to ensure that State regulations
do not “condition fundamental benefits of citizenship . . . upon whether a person
conforms to the State’s judgments about how to pursue sexual pleasure in a way that is
proper rather than debasing.”108 Ronald Dworkin has referred to this right as the right to
moral independence, and framed it more precisely:
People have the right not to suffer disadvantage in the distribution of
social goods and opportunities, including disadvantage in the liberties
permitted to them by the criminal law, just on the ground that their
officials or fellow-citizens think that their opinions about the right way for
them to lead their own lives are ignoble or wrong.109
Applied specifically to our present discussion, this concept requires judges to
scrutinize State limitations on access to the morning-after-pill in order to ensure that such
limitations are not based upon an animus toward unplanned, unprotected sexual
intercourse. While enforcing such animus would be constitutionally prohibited, it seems
at first illogical that this bias actually drives State limitations on the morning-after-pill.
No less than the morning-after-pill—and indeed to an arguably far greater degree—birth
control pills and patches facilitate the same sexual practices. Why then, should the pill
and patch be so easily obtained and the morning-after-pill require parental involvement?
There seems to be a strong possibility that, despite the insignificance of the morningafter-pill’s effect on unplanned unprotected sex, the variation exists due to the majority’s
inclination to view themselves? as sexually responsible. Because the morning-after-pill
“is employed after intercourse. . . . it may have particular appeal to the occasional sex
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consumer for use as an alternative to pre-intercourse regimens.”110 Women who have
unplanned, unprotected sex who have prepared for that eventuality by using continual
hormonal birth control methods may be widely viewed as responsible, especially by
comparison. Those women themselves make up at least one quarter of all women in the
United States.111 In fact, more than ninety percent of all women in America use some
form of birth control.112
Thus, upon further reflection, there is actually significant risk that government
action restricting access to the morning-after-pill, in actuality, manifests a majority’s
attempt to define itself by condemning actions it views as sexually irresponsible. It seems
quite unlikely, however, that the American people, even a majority of them, would
believe such a rationale would be legitimate to justify the way the law treats women who
seek access to the drug.
Certainly, the Supreme Court has not endowed morality-based legislation with its
imprimatur simply because it was created through the majoritarian process. Rather, the
Court’s reasoning in Lawrence backs a counter-majoritarian view of constitutional
democracy. For the majority, Justice Kennedy asserted that “the fact that the governing
majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a
sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.”113 Justice Stevens has
echoed this sentiment, stating that “the individual’s freedom to choose his own creed is
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the counterpart of his right to refrain from accepting the creed established by the
majority.”114
Lawrence clearly supports the premise that the majority’s condemnation of a
group of people, in that case homosexuals, is an unconstitutional justification for a law.115
Here, neither can the majority’s condemnation of those who are irresponsible in their
sexuality justify a constitutional definition of pregnancy. Judicial review, carefully
reasoning through each of the moral issues involved through the lens of the American
people’s beliefs, can ensure States cannot employ such motives.
ii. Answering the Question: Webs of Belief and SuperMajoritarianism
At last we arrive to the beginning. How should constitutional courts attack the
question at the heart of challenges to State limitations on access to the morning-after-pill?
As is hopefully becoming clear by now, that question is not the question of when life,
potential life, or pregnancy begins. The question before these courts is whether the
Constitution should recognize the existence of potential life at the time of fertilization.
This Article has argued that judges attacking this question should draw from the
American people’s beliefs. To the extent they are even accurately ascertainable,
Americans beliefs regarding what Rebecca Brown calls the “First-Order Question,”116
that is their actual beliefs as to when life begins, play only a supporting role in this
analysis. This is because the beliefs are only part of a complex web of beliefs held by the
people. Americans often hold numerous beliefs that at least potentially conflict.
Constitutional judges must, therefore, look to Americans’ First-Order beliefs in the
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context of their other beliefs, rather than in a vacuum. As such, the more important set of
beliefs, from the perspective of our constitutional judges, is a “Second-Order” set of
beliefs regarding the effect that the First-Order beliefs should have on law and the rights
of others.
This Part argues that Americans are generally disinclined to want their FirstOrder beliefs to affect the legal rights of others and that they believe such an effect is
permissible only if a supermajority of the people share the belief. As such, it argues that
courts may find that the Constitution recognizes the existence of potential life at the time
of fertilization only if a supermajority of the American people believes that it exists at
that point.
Indicia of the American people’s beliefs regarding both abortion and
homosexuality both lend themselves to the conclusion that Americans generally want
their beliefs separated from their laws. Lawrence details the fact that, at the time of the
decision, only thirteen States expressly outlawed homosexual sodomy, and less than a
third of those States actually enforced their laws.117 Given that half of all American adults
have an unfavorable view of homosexuals,118 one would think that if Americans believed
that their beliefs should always control their laws, the number of States that actively
regulated homosexuality would have been higher while such regulation was still
considered constitutional. This phenomenon cannot necessarily be explained away by
reliance on the concept that homosexuality is an immutable characteristic. As many
Americans believe that homosexuals can change their sexual orientation if they wished as
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believe to the contrary.119 More than sixty percent believe that being gay is not
preordained at birth.120 Yet, even when it was legal to do so?, the American people
overwhelmingly chose not to use the force of the law to propagate their beliefs.? There is
a distinct divide between belief and the law. It can be so only because the American
people want it that way.
Examination of Americans’ beliefs about abortion and the law reveal the same
phenomenon. The American people have long been of the belief that their personal
feelings about abortion should not dictate the rights of other to obtain an abortion. A Los
Angeles Times poll conducted in 2000 revealed that while more than half of all
Americans believed abortion to be murder, less than a quarter supported a constitutional
amendment banning the practice.121 Likewise, a recent poll revealed that seventy-eight
percent of Americans believe that abortion should be legal in at least some
circumstances.122
Again, all of this supports the premise that Americans prefer their beliefs to be
separated from their law when lack of separation would affect individual liberties. As
such, judges attempting to derive the American people’s beliefs as to questions such as
when the Constitution should first recognize the existence of potential life should begin
with a presumption that if the finding one way would restrict personal freedoms, the
American people would find the decision unsatisfactory. As such, it would be an
improper constitutional interpretation.
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Because constitutional recognition of potential life at any one point along the
continuum leading to live birth clearly limits personal freedoms at all later points,
however, any definition that places the point of recognition anywhere before live birth is
presumptively improper.? Can this be right? Clearly, this seems irreconcilable with Roe
and Casey, the death knell for a framework aspiring towards any legitimacy.
Data from the newer abortion poll mentioned above, however, pulls out another
string in the web of the American people’s Second-Order beliefs. It is this string that ties
the proposed framework back together. Three quarters of Americans believed that
abortion should be illegal in some contexts.123 Thus, there is a significant consensus that
at some point, beliefs of others should trump those of individuals seeking to act in a
certain way. Put another way, Americans appear to overwhelmingly think that their
individual beliefs should not affect the scope of constitutional rights if that belief does not
hold enough popular appeal.
Logically, if there is a place on the continuum between potential life and life
where enough people believe sanctity of the latter has been bestowed on a fetus such as to
impose that belief on others, there too must be a point on the continuum of non-existence
to existence of potential life at which this happens. If this is true, then surely
constitutional judges must account for the exceptional situations in which the vast
majority of society as a whole believes that the law should not protect certain beliefs. But
how can we separate the beliefs that carry with them the right to act on them from those
that do not?
This Article argues that constitutional judges, at least in the context of our present
discussion, should adopt a super-majoritarian principle such that the presumption against
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the propriety of a constitutional definition that limits individual rights can be rebutted
only on a finding that a supermajority, at least seventy-five percent of the people, shares a
belief. Thus, judges should find the Constitution recognizes the existence of potential life
at the point of conception only if a supermajority of Americans believes that to be true.
The reflexive response to this premise will likely be hostile. On reflection,
however, constitutional structure, case law, and the whole of criminal law each support
the idea.
1. Super-Majoritarianism and Constitutional Structure
The first amongst the parade of horribles that may come from opponents of this
idea is the exasperated: “Well, then may Christians act so as to give constitutional effect
to a declaration that Jesus is the One and only true God?” The simple answer is yes.
Clearly they may. The slightly more complex answer is that nothing in the substantive
due process analysis I have proposed would prevent it. Currently such a declaration runs
afoul of the express language of the First Amendment, but Article V of the
Constitution124 contains provisions for amending the constitution in the event that threequarters of each House of Congress of two-thirds of States propose to do so and three
quarters of States ratify the proposed amendment.125 As of 2001, seventy-seven percent
of Americans self-identified as Christians.126 It is far from beyond comprehension that
Christians could thus control enough State and federal offices to effect the change if they
so desired. The fact that they have not done so despite possessing a supermajority is
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telling. Americans place an even greater premium on the right to define one’s own God
than they do on the right to legal protection of one’s definition of life or life potential.
The broader point here is that the Constitution is in no way offended by allowing
a supermajority to define it. Eisgruber argues that these same provisions make clear that
the Constitution does not view democracy as majoritarianism.127 While this is clearly
true, it obviously does not follow that super-majoritarian decision-making offends the
super-majoritarian structure of the Constitution. Indeed, nothing in the Constitution could
reasonably be said to prevent the return of slavery through recourse to its amendment
procedures. What prevents the United States from becoming a Christian theocracy fueled
by slave labor is the fact that the American people believe such a society to be unjust.
2. Super-Majoritarianism and Precedent
Additionally, case law regarding reproductive rights under substantive due
process can only be explained satisfactorily by super-majoritarian principles. Roe and
Casey both provide significantly different protection from State efforts to restrict a
woman’s right to choose whether to abort a fetus depending on how far along in the
pregnancy she is.128 Under Roe, a woman had an almost unqualified right to choose to
abort a fetus until viability.129 Under Casey, the qualification on this right is still
relatively minor until viability.130 At the point of viability, however, something happens
that completely eviscerates the woman’s right.131 The Roe Court contends that this
something is that the fetus “then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside
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the mother's womb,” giving States compelling “logical and biological justifications” for
regulations barring abortions at this stage.132 The Casey decision also relies expressly on
this general premise and additionally on the prospect that “it might be said that a woman
who fails to act before viability has consented to the State’s intervention on behalf of the
developing child.”133
Neither rationale set forth by the Court, however, is fully satisfactory. Roe rests in
part on fact that the Constitution does not recognize fetuses as persons, though it also
recognizes a State interest in protecting their potential lives.134 Strangely, however, Roe
gives no effect to the State’s power to protect potential life until the point of viability.135
At that point, the State has complete authority to disregard the rights of a person
protected by the Constitution’s provisions in order to protect a non-person, protected by
no constitutional provision. While this Article will be far from the first to critique Roe,136
the fact remains that this reasoning seems fishy.
The Court’s decision makes much more sense, however, under the theory that the
Court simply believed that by the time a fetus has become viable, the vast majority of
society believes that a fetus has been bestowed with personhood and thus undoubtedly
deserves protection of its own. By the point of viability, fetuses have kicked with
developing legs hundreds of times and are commonly thought to have already developed
personalities.137 It seems far from unreasonable that for a supermajority of the population,

132

Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 870.
134
Roe, 410 U.S. at 157, 162.
135
See id. at 163–66.
133

136
137

41

terminating a pregnancy at that stage simply offends common sensibilities. It is unlikely
that the Court would be blind to this fact.
The reasoning in Casey lends itself even more to this theory. While parroting
Roe’s justification for the viability standard, the Casey Court premised its decision
upholding Roe on the fact that “[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”138 Adding the
addendum “until your fetus reaches viability” to this sweeping liberty makes sense only if
there is a new person to consider. If potential life in some form exists prior to viability,
why should it not receive as much protection earlier? If we are to accept the Justices’
profession that they were acting out of an “obligation . . . to define liberty for all”139 at
the expense of at least some of their own moral views, the holding in the case makes most
sense if the Justices had believed that the American public, for the most part, believed
that a viable fetus was a person, something that the public did not widely believe prior to
viability. Certainly, the Court’s unusually equivocal language in its suggestion that a
woman has waived her constitutional rights by the point of viability, its only other
justification, seems at the very least to be less than heartfelt. Moreover, as discussed,
above, States cannot legitimately rely on characterizations of women as irresponsible to
justify its regulations.140
Carey v. Population Services International141 also provides precedential support
for the premise that super-majoritarian principles are consistent with the Court’s
substantive due process decisions with respect to reproductive rights at the other end of
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the spectrum. In Carey, the Court held that it was unconstitutional for New York to limit
access to contraceptives to those 16-years-old and above by restricting the right to sell
non-prescription contraceptives to licensed pharmacists.142 Likewise, the Court garnered
a majority to hold that married individuals between 14 and 16-years-old were
constitutionally protected from outright prohibition of access to contraception.143 The
argument that those under 16 and unmarried could not be constitutionally denied
contraception, however, could not command a majority of the Court.144
These three holdings seem best reconciled with one another in light of the supermajoritarian analysis set forth above. A supermajority of the population would be quite
unlikely to believe that any personally held belief regarding the morality of contraception
should affect the rights of either consenting adults or married couples from choosing how
they want to have sex. On the other hand, a supermajority may well believe that one
under the age of 16 and unmarried has not yet reached the point at which the Constitution
should first protect that right.
Tying back into the discussion of the morning-after-pill, the Carey Court’s refusal
to recognize a right of unmarried children under the age of 16 to contraception is thus
analogous to finding first that a supermajority believes the Constitution should not yet
recognize the existence of potential life at the point just before ovulation (a fairly safe
bet.)
None of this, of course, means that the Courts in any of these cases consciously
adopted and adhered to a super-majoritarian analytical framework like the one proposed
in this Article, nor even that the cases would necessarily come out the same had they
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expressly done so. This discussion has simply sought to show that the general reasoning
of the framework offered is at least as, if not more, plausible a defense for the holdings in
these cases as any offered in the cases themselves.
iii. Super-Majoritarianism and a Functioning Society
Finally, a framework in which a presumption that any constitutional definition
that infringes on personal freedoms may be rebutted on a finding that a supermajority
believes the law should indeed infringe on those freedoms is ever-present, and essential
in a functioning society. All of criminal law is based upon the same premise. The reason
that we may put criminals in prison, that we can deprive them of numerous freedoms and
liberties, is that a supermajority of our society believes that it is permissible to imprison
criminals. Even though there may be great disagreement over the types of crimes
deserving of such punishment and the appropriate length of prison terms, the underlying
premise is accepted to a degree far beyond any of the beliefs discussed above.
The distinction between the legal effect of a belief that the state can imprison
criminals and a belief about whether potential life exists at a given point of embryonic
development, however, is simply a matter of the degree to which the beliefs are generally
held. As such, a belief that potential life exists at some point prior to the first electrical
brain activity will almost certainly be so widely held as to unblinkingly justify treating
any action to prevent live birth at that point as abortion.145 Whether it is permissible to
treat such actions as abortion at the point of fertilization is a more difficult question
purely due to the fact that it is far from clear whether a supermajority of the public
believes doing so is permissible.
iv. Derivation and Discretion
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As one would imagine, courts are not in any position to take a head-count of
Americans in their attempts to elicit the people’s First and Second-Order beliefs and
reconcile the two. Likewise, empirical data regarding Americans’ beliefs and practices
surrounding the moral question itself may be infected by a general lack of knowledge
regarding the biology involved.
For example, the birth control pill is the most widely used birth control method in
America.146 Of all women who use contraceptives, over one third use the Birth Control
Pill147 or some other form of hormonal contraceptive methods such as the Patch or an
intrauterine device.148 The public nearly universally views these birth control methods as
contraceptives. As it turns out, these methods all operate essentially identically to the
morning-after-pill.149 A court may thus be initially inclined to take this as a solid
indication that Americans believe that drugs which function in this way should be treated
as contraception. Anything more than a cursory investigation, however, will lead the
court to discover that if a young woman does not understand medical terminology such as
implantation, there is little opportunity to learn that hormonal measures to prevent
pregnancy may operate after an egg has been fertilized. Not surprisingly, nothing on
either packaging for the drugs or informational websites account for the possibility that a
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woman may consider terminating embryonic development once fertilization has occurred
an abortion.150
This goes simply to say that Constitutional judges will, therefore, have to exercise
their own moral reasoning to a certain degree in attempting to determine whether a
supermajority of the American people share a moral and political belief. A full discussion
of what evidence they should consider along the way and the relative weight it should
bare must be left for another time. As indicated above, however, as long as these judges
remain true to their call as representatives of the American people, there is nothing to fear
in their exercise of discretion.
CONCLUSION
Challenges to State efforts to restrict women’s access to the morning-after-pill
have the potential to present the courts with a question they hoped never to have to
answer and one that many see as unfit for judicial determination. Nevertheless, when the
question is properly viewed as one of federal constitutional interpretation, it becomes
clear not only that constitutional courts are not only the most appropriate body of
government to answer it, but also that they are quite capable of doing so in a manner
consistent with the best understanding of the judicial role. Through adopting a
presumption against a definition that infringes on individual liberty, rebuttable on a
finding of multiple super-majoritarian beliefs, judges effectively fill their roles as
defenders of the rights of all the people. As such, States attempting to get constitutional
judges to give constitutional effect to their beliefs that potential life exists at the point of
conception have an incredibly high, though not necessarily insurmountable, burden. This
is as the American people would want it.
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